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OF RICE UNIVERSITY

**RADICAL ISLAM AND MARYTRDOM OPERATIONS:
WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO?**

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SPONSORED BY THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
RICE UNIVERSITY - MARCH 2005

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Classical Muslim Conceptions of Martyrdom and Jihad

Martyrdom operations or suicide attacks over the past twenty years have become one of the signature operations of radical Islam. From their first appearance among the Shi'ite Hizbullah in Lebanon during the 1980s to the use of suicide by a number of secular or semi-secular groups such as the Kurdish PKK and the non-Muslim Tamil Tigers and finally to the adoption of martyrdom operations by the Palestinians, Chechens and Kashmiris during the 1990s, suicide attacks have grown more and more popular. The purpose of this policy paper will be to examine their appearance, function and strategy among radical Muslim groups and to suggest possible counter-strategies.

Muslim martyrdom is almost as old as Islam itself. The first Muslim martyrs appear shortly after the preaching of Islam in Mecca during the early seventh century. These seventh century martyrs were by and large Muslims in weak positions, usually under the authority or influence of polytheists. Under pressure from these authorities, the martyrs, when given the choice of giving up their faith or submitting to torture and sometimes death, chose the latter. However, this early phase of passive martyrdom did not persist in Islam, nor is it the norm. After the Prophet Muhammad's *hijra* (emigration) to the oasis of Medina in 622, and especially after the great Muslim conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries, Islam became closely associated with power, and for the most part, Muslims were not martyred solely for their faith.¹

Starting from the first Muslim military victories during the time of the Prophet Muhammad's ministry in Medina (622-32), Muslim martyrdom became connected largely with death in battle. The term used in Arabic, *shahid* (pl. *shuhada'*), and in all other Muslim languages, has almost the same semantic field as the Christian word "martyr", meaning both a "witness" and "one who dies or suffers because of his beliefs" (and thus bears witness to the truth of those beliefs). But the Muslim *shahid* is usually not a passive martyr; he or she is encouraged to seek out circumstances under which martyrdom can be attained. The reasons for a Muslim's wanting to attain martyrdom are clear: the martyr is accorded a lofty and certain place in heaven together with other rewards such as intercession for family members. This reward is attested to by the Qur'an 3:169-70: "And do not think those who have been killed in the way of Allah as dead;

they are rather living with their Lord, well-provided for. Rejoicing in what their Lord has given them of His bounty, and they rejoice for those who stayed behind and did not join them; knowing that they have nothing to fear and that they shall not grieve.” In the *hadith* (tradition) literature and the *jihad* literature many additional rewards are specified.²

The popularity of the title *shahid* probably caused it to be extended well beyond the defined limits of those killed in battle and includes a range of other circumstances such as those killed unjustly by rulers, those killed by plagues, those killed in defense of their homes or merchandise and other categories. It is not necessary for a Muslim to actually die in battle in order to be considered a *shahid*; merely the intention to go and fight is sufficient as well.³

Martyrdom is closely related to the topic of *jihad*, which is a major theme of Muslim history. *Jihad* is defined as religiously sanctioned and regulated warfare with the objective of augmenting the territory of Islam or defending it from an invader. In the Qur’an *jihad* is presented as part of a contract between God and man:

Allah has bought from the believers their lives and their wealth in return for Paradise; they fight in the way of Allah, kill and get killed. That is a true promise from Him in the Torah, the Gospel and the Qur’an; and who fulfils His promise better than Allah? Rejoice then at the bargain you have made with Him; for that is the great triumph. (Qur’an 9:111)⁴

However, *jihad*, despite the way it is commonly portrayed in the media (and in the colloquial usage), is not an unrestrained form of warfare. The basic goal of *jihad* is to raise the Word of God to the highest, and in order to accomplish this, *jihad* must be qualitatively different from other forms of warfare. Goals such as fame and wealth are enough to disqualify the Muslim from waging true *jihad*, and the fighter is encouraged to examine his own intentions in order to make certain that when he fights he is fighting with the purest of intentions. Muslim religious literature is full of descriptions of *jihad* and includes a number of boundaries that must be observed in order for the warfare to be *jihad* and for the martyr to be granted the title of *shahid*. These boundaries include the process of declaring war, as well as making certain that the enemy knows

what the war is about and under what terms it can be concluded. Other boundaries include fighting only combatants, making certain that specific implements of mass slaughter are avoided in battle and ensuring that the captives taken during the campaign are treated humanely.

While these above restrictions were the ideal described in the *jihad* literature and in the law books, the Muslim practice of *jihad*, practically speaking, shows a certain loosening during the aftermath of the Crusader period and the Mongol invasions (12-14th centuries). This was the time when Muslims had to face a series of invasions of the core lands of Islam (Syria—Palestine, Central Asia, Iran and Iraq), and endured a number of reverses (loss of Spain). Under these circumstances, doctrines of defensive *jihad* became much more flexible, and Muslim jurists came to allow some methods of warfare that had previously been frowned upon. For the purposes of this paper, the primary method in question was the use of the mangonel, a rock or explosive lobbing device used to bombard the walls of a city or to terrorize the inhabitants. By analogy, during the present time, the medieval acceptance of the mangonel is frequently adduced to support the use of suicide attacks (that terrorize and kill indiscriminately) as well as weapons of mass destruction. However, after the Crusader and Mongol threat had been repelled, this *jihad* literature was largely ignored until the present time.

Following the rise of radical Islam during the 1970s and 1980s, the discussions of *jihad* became more central to Muslim identity. Repeated defeats of Arab regimes at the hands of Israel, unresolved Muslim minority issues in Kashmir, the Philippines, in Bosnia—Herzegovina and Chechnya, and the problem of the lack of *shari`a* (Islamic divine law) throughout the Muslim world has fueled a powerful movement known as radical Islam. Although radical Islam is too diffuse for any single characterization, several common elements bind the movement together: a desire to implement the *shari`a* in its totality, a willingness to declare that Muslims who do not share the vision of radical Islam are actually non-Muslims (*takfir*), a feeling that the entire world is party to a conspiracy to destroy Islam and a consequent need for Muslim unity, and a fixation upon *jihad* as a salvific panacea for the problems of the Muslim world.

Radical Islam has many ideological currents, but this policy paper will focus upon those that generate martyrdom operations. These have a number of different sources. One is Shi`ite, as the

radical Shi`ites of Lebanon were among the first contemporary Muslim groups to use martyrdom operations against the United States, France and Israel during the mid—1980s.⁵ These martyrdom operations were successful in the long run, as the United States and France withdrew from Lebanon in 1984, and, eventually, Israel did the same in 2000. However, the more important focus of radical Islam during the past twenty years has been national resistance movements, especially those of the Palestinians, the Chechens and the Kashmiris, each of which will be discussed in their case-studies below. All of these national resistance movements have been gradually radicalized and associated with radical Islam, but for the most part, they each focus their violence upon a single target state (Israel, Russia or India). Since the middle 1990s the most flamboyant type of radical Islam has been globalist radical Islam (al-Qa`ida), which has taken martyrdom operations as its signature operations and popularized them throughout the Muslim world.

In order to understand the importance of martyrdom operations, we will first look at the religious justifications that support them and then the strategy behind them.

Contemporary Jihad Literature and Martyrdom Operations

Jihad literature in support of martyrdom operations or in opposition to them takes either the form of the book/pamphlet discussing the subject in detail or a *fatwa* (religious opinion) issued by a given scholar in response to a question. Starting from the mid—1990s, Muslim *jihad* literature in Arabic and Urdu began to discuss the legality of suicide attacks. The legal issues involved several separate categories of discussion. One was drawn out of the classical legal category called “the single attacker who attacks a superior force.” It is upon the basis of this category—whether in support or in opposition—that most Muslim scholars have decided whether to permit suicide attacks. The classical literature is by no means unified with regard to this legal category, which as its title suggests, deals with the question of whether a single soldier who charges a superior force is committing suicide. In general, the attitude of the scholars is that this soldier is not committing suicide as long as there is some positive benefit for the Muslim armies in his action. Even among these opinions, some cited Qur’an 61:4 “Allah loves those who fight in His

cause arrayed in battle, as though they were a compact structure” to mean that fighting should be done as a group activity and that there is no place in it for individual action.⁶

However, contemporary *jihad* literature (especially that produced since the mid—1990s) has been far more tolerant of martyrdom operations. Starting with Muhammad Khayr Haykal’s monumental three volume study, *Jihad and Fighting according to the Shar`i Policy (al-Jihad wa-l-Qital fi al-siyasa al-shara`iyya)*, we find serious discussions of the legal issues involved. Although Haykal, writing in 1993, despite his comprehensiveness, does not discuss martyrdom operations, he brings out the two other issues that are foundational for allowing these operations: attacking human shields and using the mangonel. On the face of it, these do not appear to be relevant, but the legal issues of dealing with human shields are the focus for radical Muslims in deciding whether or not civilians can be attacked. The use of the mangonel through analogy allows large-scale terror attacks that are likely to kill civilians indiscriminately. Haykal allows both of these tactics, saying that if the Muslims are likely to derive benefit from such tactics, then they should be used cautiously.⁷

The other most important treatise dealing with suicide attacks is Nawaf al-Takruri’s *Martyrdom Operations in the Legal Balance (al-`Amaliyyat al-istishhadiyya fi al-mizan al-fiqhi)*, which in its four editions issued since 1997 has come to be the authoritative guide for the legal issues. With the material from Takruri, interviews in Pakistan and Uzbekistan and material from the Internet, I have assembled a database of 61 Muslim leaders who support suicide attacks (see Appendix). In general, these *fatwas* speak of the attacks against Islam and the need for Muslims to use any efforts to repel them. For Qur’anic support they usually cite 2:205, “And some people sell themselves for the sake of Allah,” a verse that is rarely found in the classical *jihad* literature, with the interpretation that it allows for the possibility of dying for the sake of God. (One should note, however, that the use of this verse is weak and really does not support much more than martyrdom in battle). The more detailed *fatwas* usually cite examples of fighters from the time of the Prophet Muhammad. These fighters are cited for their willingness to attack an enemy in an extraordinarily brave or suicidal fashion. None of the *fatwas* seem to consider the differences between these stories and an actual suicide attack as is known during contemporary times. As

mentioned above, the legal category cited in support of suicide attacks is that of the single fighter charging a larger number of enemies.

Of the 61 *fatwas*, 32 mention the Israeli—Palestinian situation specifically, and a number of these would confine suicide attacks to this arena alone. The remaining *fatwas* either do not mention a specific geographic location for possible suicide attacks or mention other areas. The other areas are Chechnya (2), India (1) and entire world (2), and an additional two of the *fatwas* mention both Palestine and the entire world. The *fatwas* from a geographical point of view are taken from Bosnia, Egypt (6), Iran (5), Iraq (5), Jordan (3), Kuwayt (3), Lebanon (3), Pakistan (2), Palestine (3), Qatar (2), Saudi Arabia (10), Sudan (2), Syria (8), U.A.E. (1), Yemen (1), in addition to those from non-Muslim countries (Australia, Great Britain, Russia, Chechnya, and South Africa) and one from al-Qa`ida. This material strongly indicates that martyrdom operations, despite their weak basis in Muslim law, have the support of a sizable percentage of the Muslim religious leadership, especially in the core areas of the Muslim world.

It is clear from reading *fatwas* issued by prominent Muslim leaders, such as the Shaykh al-Azhar University, Muhammad Sayyid al-Tantawi, the Saudi Grand Mufti, `Abd al-`Aziz Al al-Shaykh, and the famous Muslim Brethren leader and television personality Yusuf al-Qaradawi, that they wish to confine martyrdom operations to very specific situations, usually the struggle of the Palestinians against Israel. All three of these leaders have regularly issued “clarifications” of their stance on martyrdom operations after the radical Muslim attacks of September 11, 2001, and have clarified themselves yet further after the appearance of martyrdom operations directed against Muslims in Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Iraq. However, it remains to be seen whether “clarifications” of this nature have the desired effect.

Not all *jihad* and *fatwa* literature, including literature associated with radical Islam, discusses martyrdom operations favorably. Critiques of martyrdom operations fall into several categories:

1. Religiously based critiques. Examples of these critiques are those of Nasir al-Din al-Albani, the famous Syrian traditionalist, who maintained that martyrdom operations were suicide and that no amount of semantics would avoid that fact.⁸ Another critique appears

in the radical Muslim *jihad* primer, *al-'Umda li-Jihad fi sabil Allah*. This treatise critiques suicide attacks on the basis of the fact that they are sought by those who desire fame and that the true *mujahid* would not seek out such flamboyant operations.⁹

2. Critiques emphasizing tactics. Since martyrdom operations frequently kill civilian innocents (even by the loose standards of radical Muslims) and/or Muslims and violate other laws of *jihad*, Muslim scholars have critiqued or questioned the tactics involved.¹⁰ Usually these critiques do not actually prohibit suicide attacks *per se*, but they would place such limitations upon the use of them (making certain that civilians or Muslims are not part of the target population) that effectively the advantages gained by their use would be nullified.
3. Critiques emphasizing strategy and propaganda. Martyrdom operations are occasionally critiqued by Muslims for bringing the reputation of Islam into disrepute, destroying the moral basis for an otherwise legitimate cause (such as the cause of the Palestinians, the Kashmiris or the Chechens)¹¹ or because they do not accomplish the military or propaganda goals claimed for them by their proponents.¹²

It is apparent from reading radical Muslim discussions of suicide attacks and their effects that the most potent critique leveled against them is the fact that they kill civilians and/or Muslims. Ultimately, this carelessness with regard to non-Muslim and Muslim civilians goes back to one of the foundational aspects of radical Islam: the use of *takfir*, which is making the claim that large numbers of apparent Muslims are in fact apostate. Since this is true according to their analysis, Muslims who are located either permanently or temporarily in the vicinity of non-Muslims (who are legitimate targets according to the radical Muslim viewpoint) are very likely to be apostate Muslims. To date, there are no known Muslim critiques of martyrdom operations that employ an objective moral criticism of the practice of terror.

Although there is logic behind this radical critique of contemporary Muslim society, it is such that most Muslims will not be swayed by it. This is a critical weak point in radical Islam and needs to be exploited in the effort to detach Muslim sympathy from their causes. The same holds

true for killing civilians in martyrdom or other terrorist operations. The killings at Beslan in southern Russia by the Chechen rebels had a profound (if brief) effect upon the Muslim perception of the rightness of the Chechen cause. These types of situations demonstrate the line that radical Muslims must walk: their operations must be flamboyant enough to gain attention, but yet targeted against those objectives that will be seen (at least in the Muslim world) as legitimate from a religious and strategic point of view. This makes the planning of martyrdom operations a difficult problem.

Martyrdom operations

Martyrdom operations or suicide attacks are often referred to as the weapons of the weak and poor against stronger opponents. The process is deceptively simple: choosing a vulnerable target; preparing a martyr, who has usually volunteered for the job; indoctrinating him or her; providing that person with the explosives needed and the means to arrive at the target; and then making certain that it is difficult for investigators to find the true perpetrators. This type of smart bomb, in which the detonator theoretically can make the last minute changes possibly necessary to maximize the number of casualties, is effective in certain situations and in accomplishing several goals.

Firstly, it is important to note that, as Robert Pape has in his important study of suicide attacks during the past twenty years, these types of operations are primarily useful against democracies. Pape lists off the democracies targeted: Israel, the United States, Russia, Sri Lanka, India, to which we can add Indonesia, Kenya, Tanzania, Turkey and Iraq (to the extent to which Iraq can now be spoken of as a democracy). However, since he wrote this article, the use of suicide attacks has migrated to other less democratic states under the influence of al-Qa`ida: Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Uzbekistan and Pakistan. Nonetheless, the primary operational field of suicide attacks remains democracies. With the exception of the attacks against President Parviz Musharraf of Pakistan and the bizarre bombings in the Charsu Market in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, most of the attacks in non-democratic countries have been against targets associated with democracies such as the United States.

Secondly, the goals of martyrdom operations can be varied. One goal that is common to radical Muslims is the fact that the martyr demonstrates a self-sacrificial type of Islam that stands in contradistinction to the governmentally supported religious elites they despise. As `Abdallah `Azzam, the teacher of Usama bin Ladin stated:

History does not write its lines except with blood. Glory does not build its lofty edifices except with skulls. Honor and respect cannot be established except on a foundation of cripples and corpses. Empires, distinguished peoples, states and societies cannot be established except with examples. Indeed those who think they can change reality or change societies without blood, sacrifice and invalids, without pure, innocent souls, do not understand the essence of this *din* [religion] and they do not know the method of the best of Messengers [Muhammad].¹³

This process of leading by example is designed to be transformative of the Muslim societies that are the principal audience of radical Muslims. According to this analysis, the examples set by such martyrdom operations should lead inexorably to a future Islamic state.

The propaganda aspect of martyrdom operations is also designed for the non-Muslim audience as well. Fundamental to this propaganda is the sense that there is no true defense against suicide attackers and that democratic societies must somehow confront the issues they represent because they will not go away or be defeated. Inherent in this statement is the fear of and lack of understanding of true belief that is shared by most elites in secular democratic states. Because they cannot conceive of the type of belief that would lead someone to blow themselves up, usually in the midst of civilians, there is a certain sense of inevitability that goes along with the actual terror.

Of course, one cannot deny the reality of the terror caused by suicide attacks. As the writer of the “Islamic Ruling on the Permissibility of Martyrdom Operations” (probably Yusuf al-`Ayyiri, the leader of al-Qa`ida in Saudi Arabia until his death in June 2003) stated:

As for the effects of these operations on the enemy, we have found, through the course of our experience that there is no other technique which strikes as much terror into their hearts, and which shatters their spirit as much. On account of this they refrain from mixing with the population, and from oppressing, harassing and looting them. They also become occupied with trying to expose such operations before they occur, which has distracted them from other things.¹⁴

What the author stated here is essentially correct: a population can be driven by martyrdom operations into a hysterical or catatonic state because any group of people in a given democratic state or society anywhere can be a target. Martyrdom operations are truly democratic in that sense; they go where the people are. These different types of propaganda are effective in achieving the goals of radical Islam, in addition to communicating the message of Islam from a missionary point of view. Although this final point is difficult to quantify, it is clear that people are actually attracted to Islam and convert to it as a result of martyrdom operations.

Martyrdom operations can be carried out by anyone—men and women both—but there are certain categories of Muslims that are more likely to carry them out. Despite the fact that one can no longer exclusively confine martyrdom operations to single, unemployed males under the age of 30, this category is still a dominant one. Another group that is highly likely to carry out martyrdom operations is one among Muslims who have been compromised in some way. For men, a compromised position usually means perhaps having collaborated with an enemy or engaged in criminal activities, while women are usually compromised by illicit sexual activity. Yet another group that is inordinately represented among martyrs is that of converts, who are under extraordinary pressure to find acceptance in their new community. Overarching all of these groups is the ideal of sincere piety and pure intentionality (i.e., that the intention of the martyr is to die solely for the sake of Islam).¹⁵ However, in many cases, one strongly suspects—especially among the Palestinians—that this ideal is not lived up to (after one looks at the situations or stories of the martyrs) and that a number of martyrs have been manipulated or psychologically abused. Given the categories listed above, all of them exhibit some type of vulnerability to pressure either because of their actions or their marginality in their societies. This fact is

incompatible with the legal definitions of martyrdom operations, and in trying to defeat the use of martyrdom operations, needs to be brought out.

We will now turn to the case-studies of four groups of conflicts, in which radical Muslims have used martyrdom operations with the goal of extracting policy recommendations relevant to the United States.

Case-studies: the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Of all the conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims, that of the Palestinians against Israel is both the most straightforward and the most varied (in terms of who participates). The use of martyrdom operations by radical Palestinian groups is usually held to have begun in 1994, as a reaction against the massacre perpetrated in the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron and was used selectively throughout the middle 1990s. As Robert Pape has demonstrated, Palestinian radical groups (Hamas and Jihad al-Islami) that used martyrdom operations effectively achieved their goals—Israeli withdrawals and other concessions—during this preliminary period. However, the radical Palestinian Muslim use of martyrdom operations was also a challenge to the Palestinian National Authority during the period 1994-2000, as the latter was attempting to conduct negotiations with Israel at the same time. Between 1996-2000, the PNA suppressed a number of martyrdom operations and periodically punished the groups initiating them.

However, after the outbreak of the Second Intifada (2000—present), the PNA has not made a serious attempt to suppress martyrdom operations, and they have become a hallmark characteristic of this Intifada (as opposed to the First Intifada, 1987-93, which was largely mass protests and civil disobedience). These martyrdom operations demonstrate several patterns: an initial phase of exploratory martyrdom operations, beginning in October 2000—September 2001, followed by an extreme period of escalation during Jan. 2002—June 2002 (44 attacks). This escalation resulted in the Israeli reoccupation of much of the West Bank during March—April 2002. Then, there was a break until the resumption of attacks in late Sept. 2002 until June 2003 (a further 25 attacks). Martyrdom operations have tapered off sharply since the summer of 2003, though when they do happen, they tend to be very deadly.¹⁶

The Israeli—Palestinian conflict has thrown together a wide range of disparate groups, and one cannot speak of a substantive difference between the nominally secular—nationalist groups such as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, socialist—communist groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Islamic—national resistance groups such as Hamas, and globalist Islamic groups such as the Jihad al-Islami. All have used more or less the same tactics, and all, with the exception of the PFLP, use the same Islamic rhetoric in order to describe the martyr and their mission. There is no commonality between the martyrs, as rich, poor and middle class, young and old, men, women¹⁷ and children, educated and non-educated, have all participated in martyrdom operations.¹⁸ If there were any commonality, it would only be that when one group became too prominent (and therefore more easily identified by the Israeli security forces), then another less prominent group (such as women or children) would come to the fore. Of the Palestinian society, only Christian Arabs thus far have not taken part in martyrdom operations. Nor is there a commonality to the targets chosen or the geographic region. Buses and shopping areas have been hit hard, but equally nightclubs, restaurants, hotels and gambling operations. The martyrs, when choosing their targets, do not seem to discriminate between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs.

Analysts have asked what the Palestinian strategy behind the martyrdom operations could possibly be. This is a difficult question because there are so many exceptions that a coherent strategy seems impossible to discern, and it may be with so many disparate groups pushing for martyrdom operations that there is no one strategy. However, on a local—personal level, many of the martyrs seem motivated by personal vengeance.¹⁹ Some mention specific grievances; others cite the situation as a whole; and perhaps the goal of shaming others—usually Arab or Muslim governments and elites—into action. A minority of the martyrs uses purely Islamic—salvific rhetoric and within the context of the Palestinian society, even given the prominence of these slogans and the radicalization of the people, these ideas do not seem to be the primary motivation behind suicide attacks. However, it is also apparent that the collective sense of martyrdom that is fostered by so many disparate groups in the Palestinian society makes up for the fact that the Second Intifada is not as popular as the first was. This collective ideal is

promoted by the martyrologies published by the Palestinians and their supporters in the Arab world.²⁰

On a larger plane, it is apparent that the groups initiating martyrdom operations do have a strategy. Although in some cases this strategy is nothing more than demonstrating to Israel that it is not immune from vengeance by Palestinians, it seems clear that during the period of January—June 2002, the Palestinians sought to bring Israel to its knees using martyrdom operations. However, this offensive brought an Israeli military response (re-occupation of the West Bank), and significantly detracted from the world-wide support that the Palestinians need in order to offset the military advantages that Israel has over them. This fact highlights the problems inherent in the use of martyrdom operations. Because of their indiscriminant slaughter of Israeli civilians (given the fact that very few of the suicide attacks were actually directed at the Israeli military), Palestinians were not and have not been able to gain the world sympathy they needed to defeat Israel.

In hindsight, it seems clear that the Palestinian use of martyrdom operations fed off the easy access that the Palestinians had to Israel and the difficulties of dividing the populations of this thickly settled and inter-mixed land. Following the suicide campaign of 2002-3, Israel decided to build a barrier to keep Palestinian suicide attackers out of its territory, and it appears—at least upon an initial analysis—that this barrier is working. The suicide attacks carried out since the erection of the barrier have only been directed against those areas in which the barrier has not been completed; other previously hard-hit areas of Israel have been comparatively peaceful. This in itself suggests that the Palestinian martyrdom attacks relied heavily on quick penetration of Israel and did not build up sleeper suicide cells for a long-term strategy of attack. But of course, as the barrier becomes more of a reality, they might have to change these tactics.

With the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip close to a reality, it seems clear that Pape is correct once again: the suicide campaign against Israel worked. Without any form of negotiation or tangible benefits for Israel, the Palestinians managed to wear them out, and gain substantial territory. While Israel might plausibly argue that this territory was one to which it was not deeply committed, nonetheless, the victory for martyrdom operations is apparent. On the other hand,

with the building of the barrier, the Palestinians will have to work much harder to accomplish a similar goal with regard to the settlements in the West Bank and especially the Israeli domination of Jerusalem. These are two areas to which Israel is much more committed and will fight much harder to keep.

Case-studies: Chechnya

The appearance of suicide attacks associated with the Chechen national resistance to Russia was one of the signs that this struggle has become more of a global Islamic one and less of a nationalistic one. After the re-occupation of Chechnya in 1999, by the Russian Army, the Chechen resistance resorted to guerilla warfare. The first suicide attack came in June 2000. This suicide attack was the occasion of the writing of “The Islamic Ruling on the Permissibility of Martyrdom Operations,” which according to the text was written to answer the question of whether Hawa Barayev (the woman who, together with a companion, carried out the attack) had committed suicide. Nowhere in the text does the author—according to radical Muslim sources on the Internet Yusuf al-`Ayyiri—address the question of whether women can carry out martyrdom operations.

As actual military operations by the Chechen rebels have diminished, martyrdom operations have become much more important. They usually strike in the Russian heartland, and either take the form of suicide bomb blasts, like the Palestinian model, or hostage taking by suicide squads who appear willing to commit suicide with their hostages if their demands are not met. This method of hostage—taking appears to be uniquely Chechen. The Chechen tactics are devised specifically for Russia, and like the Palestinians, they are careful not to widen the war by attacking other countries (although foreign nationals inside Chechnya are occasionally targeted). Unusual to radical Islam, many of the Chechen suicide attackers have been women (of 20 major attacks until September 2004, ten were perpetrated by women or included women among the attackers).²¹

Starting with then President Aslan Maskhadov’s proclamation of *shari`a* law in 1999, the Chechen conflict has taken on an ever increasing association with radical Islam, to the point at

which there were links between al-Qa`ida and the Chechens, and a number of the latter trained in Afghanistan. The other ideological link is with Saudi Arabia. Most of the *fatwas* that support suicide attacks in Chechnya have been penned by Saudi religious figures, and the leader of the foreign radical Muslim faction in that country, Khattab, was from Saudi Arabia as well. No religious leaders from other countries (other than Chechnya itself) dealing with martyrdom operations are known to have written in support of them. It is probably due to this link that the Chechens came to be involved with al-Qa`ida.

The prognosis for suicide attacks from the Chechen rebels is grim. Overwhelmingly, the strategy of using suicide attackers has been a successful one and has kept the Russian population aware of the Chechen problem. It may lead eventually to a willingness on the part of the Russian government to negotiate with the Chechens because there does not seem to be any way to keep the suicide attackers from striking at will. Building a wall—barrier in the Israeli fashion would not have the desired effects because of the large Chechen population inside Russia proper, and because of the fact that, to a large extent, Chechens are well-integrated into Russian society (i.e., they speak Russian and do not appear noticeably different). The mass casualties the Chechen suicide attackers have inflicted upon Russian society may, however, gradually lose them support in the Muslim world.

Case-studies: Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia

In contradistinction to the two previous case-studies, the martyrdom operations associated with Afghanistan and Central Asia do not have the character of a national resistance movement. They are purely formulated by the necessities of *jihād* against governments deemed to be apostate Muslim (Afghanistan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan), and with the larger goals of globalist radical Islam.

Martyrdom operations in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in December 2001 have garnered little outside attention, and do not seem to be differentiated from the overall Islamic resistance to the Hamid Karzai regime (which they see as infidel). Comparatively few martyrdom operations took place during the period October—December 2001 while actual

fighting was taking place. As usual, most of the attacks since that time have either been directed at the civilian population, with the objective of creating a sense of lawlessness and terror (mostly in Kabul or Kandahar), or attempting to assassinate prominent government officials. It is clear that since the suicide assassination of Ahmad Shah Mas`ud in September 2001, the Afghan government is very aware of this method of assassination, and it has not been very successful. Like other terrorist attacks, martyrdom operations require extensive press coverage to be successful, and it seems that outside of these prominent cities that coverage is lacking, and therefore attacks do not occur.

In Pakistan, there is a great deal more press coverage, and suicide attacks have become much more common during the period 2000 to the present. These take the forms of sectarian suicide attacks, usually against (Shi`ite) mosques or churches, and assassination attempts, such as the two on President Parviz Musharraf (Dec. 14, 25, 2003). The sectarian suicide attacks do not appear to be the work of globalist radical Muslims but are localized and are part of the sectarian violence that has plagued Pakistan since the early 1990s. It appears, when the goals of the attackers can be ascertained, that they desire revenge for specific issues—and thus deliberately attack places holy to their opponents—or desire to foment civil war. Very few of the sectarian Pakistani attackers, unlike globalist radical Muslims elsewhere or Palestinians and Chechens, leave statements of their intent. However, the intent was clear behind the assassination attempts against President Musharraf, which were quite well-planned and clearly relied upon intelligence from sources close to the president. Although neither was successful, the goals of globalist radical Islam will not be served until he is dead, and thus, one can count on more assassination attempts.

The *fatwas* supporting martyrdom operations emanating from Pakistan, however, concern the fighting in Kashmir against the Indian Army. Again, since martyrdom operations are in general militarily ineffective, the attacks' primary focus has been to create terror among civilians, whether Muslims perceived as collaborating with the Indian government or Hindus who form a minority in the valley of Kashmir. But one should note that unlike the Palestinian situation, a significant minority of the suicide attacks in Kashmir have been successful against the Indian Army, which apparently has not adequately prepared its soldiers to deal with this type of attack.

Pakistani religious leaders interviewed justify these attacks on the basis of the idea that genocide is being carried out by the Indian Army against the Muslims of Kashmir, an allegation that is demonstrably false.²²

Of all the martyrdom operations in this region, the most unusual were those carried out (apparently) by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan at the Charsu Bazaar in central Tashkent in March 2004. (One should note, however, that no one has ever taken responsibility for these attacks, and that the IMU may have been blamed unjustly.) These were followed up by suicide attacks at the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Tashkent on July 30, 2004. Interviewing in Uzbekistan did not reveal any of the perpetrators or likely motives of the first attack although the second one was apparently in response to the trial of those individuals implicated in the first attack. But interviewing Muslim religious leaders in the Ferghana Valley, the home of many of the radical Muslim leaders, revealed a number of individuals sympathetic to the goals of radical Islam, even among the official *'ulama'*. None would say they supported suicide attacks;²³ however, nor could any of them explain the Charsu bombings within the context of radical Islam. Like the Chechens a number of the suicide attackers were women,²⁴ but their goals, other than the foundation of a Muslim state, are not clear, and so it is difficult to know whether the perpetrators of these operations considered them to have been a success or a failure.

In general, the radical Muslim suicide operations within Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan suffer from a lack of media attention, and with the exception of targeted assassinations, few clear-cut goals. One can count on high-profile supporters of the United States, such as Karzai and Musharraf, being the continued targets of suicide attacks, since their radical Muslim opponents lack any other effective way of getting at them.

Case-studies: Indonesia

Starting with the Bali attacks on October 12, 2002, and then the repeated attacks in Jakarta (August 5, 2003 and September 9, 2004), Indonesia, on western targets (the Marriott Hotel, the Australian Embassy), the radical Islamic group Jama`a Islamiyya has begun using suicide attacks. These attacks stand out because they do not appear to be part of a pattern of response to

grievances or governmental repression, nor do they seem obviously tied to the formation of an Islamic state. Instead, they serve the globalist radical Muslim necessity to drive non-Muslims out of Muslim countries. In all of the above cases—while the terror created by the suicide attacks has temporarily driven foreigners away—there has been no groundswell of support among the Indonesian Muslim population for the goals of the radical Muslims.²⁵

However, the fact that the Jama`a Islamiyya has managed to bring suicide terrorism to Indonesia, in spite of all the negative publicity it has received, is cause for concern. In other words, this radical Muslim group is not going to be deterred by the fact that Indonesians do not support its *jihad* against foreigners, and it does not appear to have trouble finding suicide attackers willing to carry out these operations. Significantly, the next-door nationalist—religious insurgency of the Moros in the southern Philippines does not seem to have adopted the tactics of suicide attacks, despite the fact that it is a popular uprising and suffers a high level of repression from a democratic government—all apparently key factors in the choice of Palestinians and Chechens to use martyrdom operations. This is a situation that needs to be watched more closely.

Policy Recommendations

For the American policy maker, the significantly useful and disturbing case-study involving martyrdom operations is that of Indonesia and Southeast Asia is particularly noteworthy. Both the Israeli—Palestinian and Chechen cases involve radicalized populations whose struggle is mixed between nationalistic and radical Islamic groups and moreover have easy and intimate access towards their target states (Israel and Russia) and who have long histories of grievances that help supply these causes with numerous martyrs. In both cases, probably the only solution to the problem of suicide attackers is to hermetically seal off the easy access of the suicide attackers (as Israel is in the process of doing) and deny them the ability to enter at will. However, the United States does not have a radicalized Muslim population close by that can act in a similar fashion.

Indonesia and the other al-Qa`ida sponsored suicide attacks in Africa are important because these countries do not have a history of occupation. Instead, these attacks demonstrate that martyrdom

operations are tactics that can now be transplanted across borders into regions where comparatively few Muslims support their existence. There is little evidence of popular Muslim support for suicide attacks in Indonesia or Africa, and yet the suicide attackers are tolerated and seem to have the freedom to accomplish their goals, even if that accomplishment involves killing large numbers of Muslims and economically devastating many others (such as in Kenya and Indonesia). The same is true of the Iraqi resistance, where the vast majority of those killed have been Iraqi Muslims, and yet the population has not turned against the martyrs.

The future of martyrdom operations therefore is likely to be global and not national resistance. Both the Palestinians and the Chechens have exhausted what strategic use can be wrung out of suicide attacks. In both cases, they will likely persist, but together with other more effective tactics (hostage taking, firing missiles, other types of bombing). This is important for the United States because the available evidence suggests that like the other democracies targeted by suicide attacks, the United States is vulnerable to a progressive rise in terror aimed to influence its national policies.

The terrible impact of terror attacks on U.S. targets and the importance of such attacks on U.S. policy formation are such that the United States needs to embark on a program of public diplomacy aimed to limit the appeal of such tactics. To this end, the author offers policy recommendations for confronting martyrdom operations as follows:

1. If we work under the assumption that radical fundamentalist Muslims are sincere in following religious rulings, valuing them and shaping their strategies accordingly, then it is imperative that the United States begin to counter the religious and propaganda aspect of suicide attacks. *Fatwas* already issued cannot be retracted (or in most cases the retractions will not have the desired effect if it is commonly perceived that the retraction was done because of non-Muslim coercion). However, legitimate religious reasons for opposing them must be publicized *and publicized on a continual basis* in order to make people think carefully about how weak the case for suicide attacks really is. Other differences highlighted in this paper between the popular—religious perception of martyrdom operations and their reality need to be brought out and emphasized as well.

2. Secondly, the propaganda aspect of martyrdom operations must be hit hard. Currently, most of the martyrs are seen as heroic, because that is the image they have projected and the one that Arab and Muslim media foster. However, it is incumbent upon the United States to fight that image by constantly emphasizing the numbers of civilians and Muslims who are killed by martyrdom operations. As one can see from the frequent need of radical Muslims to defend themselves from this charge, it is a sensitive point. It is one that TV shows should be playing all the time, continuously in order for the message to strike home. This should be coupled together with reading of Prophetic *hadiths* and Qur'anic verses in which regulations in warfare and mercy towards one's enemy are extolled. Only through this continual pressure can a wedge be driven between the radical Muslims and their (largely) passive supporters. They need to hear the message that martyrdom operations kill Muslims (especially in Iraq, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia). The religious leadership needs to realize that irresponsible endorsements of suicide attacks in certain places (Israel, Iraq, Chechnya) will eventually come back to afflict the Muslim world, and must be held accountable for their words.
3. From a strategic point of view, as Robert Pape stated, suicide attacks feed off the perception that they work and that they create a sense of hopelessness and terror on the part of the democratic countries that are their primary target. Therefore, it is necessary at whatever cost that policy making decisions be divorced from the occurrence of martyrdom operations so as to deny their perpetrators the success they crave. Pro-active consideration must be taken so that conciliatory policy responses do not appear to be influenced by martyrdom actions. While this in certain situations might be difficult to do, the cost of continual suicide attacks is much higher if policy makers ignore this basic precept.
4. Attention needs to be focused upon the negative effects that the culture of adulation of suicide attacks has produced in the Arab Muslim world, and to a lesser extent in Pakistan. These include a rise in actual suicides that are unrelated to attacks, a degradation and

destruction of the vibrant Muslim culture, and diminished moral authority accorded to the religious leadership (which is heavily implicated in the support for suicide attacks). Efforts should be made to focus upon a positive ways of building up Islam rather than focusing upon a culture of death and destruction (as among the Palestinians and others).

5. Note should be made of the Muslims that are the most likely to carry out suicide attacks inside the United States and other places. These are, as stated above, those transients, especially students and other visitors who react extremely negatively to American society, and converts to Islam. It appears, at least thus far, that immigrants have not been a prominent part of al-Qa`ida, nor is there good evidence that 2nd or 3rd generation American Muslims are open to its ideology. Security attention, therefore, should focus primarily upon those groups that to date have demonstrated a willingness to associate with globalist radical Islam, and *not* upon the balance of American Muslims who have demonstrated an immunity to it.

In general, probably the most useful tactic in fighting suicide attacks is simply to resolve that they can be fought and defeated. Defeating the terror they engender is crucial, both in the physical sense and in the psychological and mental sense.

**APPENDIX: LIST OF MUSLIM LEADERS SUPPORTING
SUICIDE ATTACKS/MARTYRDOM OPERATIONS²⁶**

Name	Affiliation	Source	Specification
<u>Bosnia (Sarajevo)</u>			
1. Ahmad `Abd al-Karim Najib		<i>Masa'il</i> , 29	
<u>Egypt</u>			
2. al-Azhar `ulama'		Takruri, 120-1 (May, 1996)	Palestine
3. Muhammad Sayyid al-Tantawi, Shaykh of al-Azhar		<i>Masa'il</i> , 38-9 (Aug. 8, 1997)	Palestine
4. Nasir Farid al-Wasil, Mufti of Egypt		Takruri, 143-4; memri.org	
5. `Abd al-Mun`im `Ashur		<i>Masa'il</i> , 39-40 (Apr. 25, 2001)	Palestine
6. Yahya Isma`il		<i>Masa'il</i> , 41	
7. A group of Egyptian `ulama' (21 names)		<i>Masa'il</i> , 41	Palestine
		Takruri, 144-52	
<u>Iran</u>			
8. Khomeini, leader of Iran (1979-89)		<i>Masa'il</i> , 27-8	Iran-Iraq War
9. Nasr Makarim al-Shirazi		<i>Masa'il</i> , 28	Palestine
10. Husayn Nuri al-Hamdani		<i>Masa'il</i> , 28	
11. Muhammad Fadil al-Lankarani		<i>Masa'il</i> , 28-9	Palestine
12. Muhammad Yazdi		<i>Masa'il</i> , 29 (Apr. 20, 2002)	
<u>Iraq</u>			
13. Muhammad Sa`id al-Hakim (Shi`ite)		<i>Masa'il</i> , 34-5	
14. A group of `Iraqi `ulama'		Takruri, 153	
15. Muhsin `Abd al-Hamid		Takruri, 161-4	Palestine
16. Ibrahim al-Na`ma		Takruri, 170-1	Palestine
<u>Jordan</u>			
17. A group of Jordanian `ulama'		Takruri, 119-20 (Mar. 26, 1996)	
18. `Ali al-Suwa'		<i>Masa'il</i> , 26; Takruri, 125-7	Palestine
19. Hammam Sa`id		Takruri, 127-8 (Apr. 1996)	Palestine
<u>Kuwait</u>			
20. Hamd al-`Ali		<i>Masa'il</i> , 35-6	
21. `Ujayl Jasim al-Nashami		Takruri, 130-4	Palestine
22. `Abd al-Razzaq al-Shayaji		Takruri, 134-7	
<u>Lebanon</u>			
23. Faysal al-Mawlawi		<i>Masa'il</i> , 36-7 (Apr. 25, 2001; Nov. 31, 2002)	Palestine
24. Husayn Fadlallah (Shi`ite)		<i>Masa'il</i> , 37-8	Palestine
25. Fathi Yakan		Takruri, 137-41	
<u>Non-Muslim Countries</u>			
26. Taj al-Din al-Hilali, Mufti of Australia and New Zealand		<i>Masa'il</i> , 26-7	
27. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi			

28. Nafi` Allah Ashayrov, Mufti of Russia *Masa'il*, 29 Palestine
29. Ibrahim Desai, Mufti of Capetown S.A. khurasaan.com Palestine
30. "Suicide Attacks" (Chechnya) qoqaz.com (Mar. 1, 2002) Chechnya
- Pakistan
31. `Abd al-Rahman al-Makki markazdawa.org India
32. `Abd al-Malik Ghulam Rasul *Masa'il*, 29 Palestine
- Palestine
33. `Ikrima Sabri, Mufti of al-Aqsa Takruri, 168-70 Palestine
34. Hamas Palestine
35. Nizar `Abd al-Qadir Riyyan *Masa'il*, 35 (Sept. 6, 2001) Palestine
- Al-Qa`ida
36. Abu Sa`id al-`Amili aloswa.com global
- Qatar
37. Yusuf al-Qaradawi qaradawi.net, *Masa'il*, 40 Palestine
(Apr. 8, 2001, Apr. 9, 2002),
Khutab, 208; Takruri, 128-30
38. `Ali al-Qurra Daghi *Masa'il*, 35 Palestine
- Saudi Arabia
39. `Abdallah b. Humayd, Mufti of Mecca Takruri, 123 (1979)
40. `Ali b. Khudayr al-Khudayr alkhoder.com (5/3/1422)
41. Ibn Jibrin islammemo.com, *Masa'il*, 30-1 Palestine
42. Sulayman al-`Ulwan alneda.com, forsan.net, Palestine, global
alsalafiyoon.com, *Masa'il*, 31
Takruri, 154-6
43. Yusuf al-`Ayyiri (?) "Islamic Ruling" *Nida' al-Islam*, Chechnya
44. Hamud al-Shu`aybi aloqla.com; Takruri, 156-61 Palestine, global
45. `Abd al-`Aziz Al al-Shaykh, Grand Mufti, maktaba.net Palestine
46. Muhammad b. Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh Takruri, 172
47. Salih al-Sawi tawhed.ws, alneda.com Palestine
48. `Abdallah b. Munay` *Masa'il*, 30-1; Takruri, 171 Palestine
islammemo.com (May 10, 2002)
49. Salman al-`Awda Takruri, 164-8 global
- Sudan
50. Ahmad `Ali al-Iman *Masa'il*, 34 (2002)
51. A group of Sudanese `ulama' Takruri, 152-3
- Syria
52. Ahmad Kaftaro, Mufti of Syria *Masa'il*, 30 (May 19, 2001) Palestine
53. Muhammad al-Khatib *Masa'il*, 32
54. Muhammad Fatih al-Kattani *Masa'il*, 32
55. Fathallah al-Qadi *Masa'il*, 32-3 Palestine
56. Wahbat al-Zuhayli *Masa'il*, 33; Takruri, 124 Palestine
57. Muhammad al-Zuhayli Takruri, 122-3 Palestine
58. Muhammad Sa`id al-Buti *Masa'il*, 33; Takruri, 124-5
59. Muhammad Karim Rajih Takruri, 141-2 Palestine
- United Arab Emirates
60. Ahmad al-Haddad, Grand Mufti *Masa'il*, 27 Palestine

Yemen

61. `Abd al-Wahhab al-Daylami

Masa'il, 42 (Apr. 24, 2000) Palestine

¹ At least not by non-Muslims; martyrdom of Muslims by Muslims continued and was quite prevalent.

² E.g., Ibn al-Nahhas, *Mashari` al-ashwaq* (Beirut: Dar al-Basha'ir al-Islamiyya, 2003), II, pp. 730-71.

³ For all the categories, see Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti, *Abwab al-sa`ada fi asbab al-shahada* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qiyyama, 1987).

⁴ Translations are from Majid Fakhry, *The Qur'an: A Modern English Version* (London: Garnet, 1997).

⁵ See for analysis Sa`d Abu Diya, *Dirasa tahliliyya fi al-`amaliyyat al-istishhadiyya fi janub Lubnan* (Beirut: Jami`at al-`Ummal al-Matabi` al-Ta`awuniyya, 1986).

⁶ Ibn al-Nahhas, *Mashari` al-ashwaq*, I, pp. 535-6; note that Nasir al-Din al-Albani, in Muhammad Tu`mat al-Qudat, *al-Mughamara bi-l-nafs* (Amman: Dar al-Furqan, 1999), p. 37 took the same position.

⁷ Haykal, *al-Jihad wa-l-Qital fi al-siyasa al-shara'iyya* (Beirut: Dar al-Barayiq, 1993), II, pp. 1267-8, 1343-61; and see the *fatwa* of Nasir al-Fahd at <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/abubanan2/message/221>.

⁸ Nawwaf al-Takruri, *Amaliyyat al-istishhadiyya fi al-mizan al-fiqhi* (Damascus: Takruri, 2004), pp. 105-7.

⁹ `Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz, *Risalat al-`umda li-jihad fi sabil Allah* (from tawhed.com), pp. 353-8.

¹⁰ E.g., after the Riyadh bombings of May 2003, see memri.org Special Dispatch series #505 "Saudi Press: Initial Reactions to the Riyadh Bombings" (May 15, 2003); and "A Statement from the Committee of Senior Scholars...Concerning the Riyadh Explosions" at islamica.com.

¹¹ For example, both the Palestinian and Chechen suicide attacks have been critiqued in this manner: memri.org, Special Dispatch series #393 "A Palestinian Communiqué against Martyrdom Attacks" (June 25, 2002); #474 "Egyptian Opposition Daily Condemns Suicide Martyrdom Operations" (Feb. 25, 2003); #780 "Arab and Muslim Reactions to the Terrorist Attack in Beslan, Russia" (Sept. 8, 2004).

¹² E.g., Mari`i b. `Abdallah b. Mar`i, *Ahkam al-mujahid bi-l-nafs* (Medina: Maktabat al-`Ulum wa-l-Hikam, 2003), II, pp. 397-99; and the Saudi scholar Ibn `Uthaymin, cited in Tu`mat al-Qudat, *Mughamara*, pp. 38-9.

¹³ `Abdallah `Azzam, "Martyrs: The Building Blocks of Nations," at <http://66.96.205.195/~azzam/afghan/html>. This citation can be found his *Fadl al-shahada* (Peshawar: Markaz al-Shahid `Abdallah `Azzam, n.d.), p. 25.

¹⁴ "The Islamic Ruling on the Permissibility of Martyrdom Operations," pp. 2-3 (written for the Chechens).

¹⁵ E.g., Abu Sa`id al-`Amili, "Wa-Yattakhidh minkum Shuhada'," at aloswa.com (May 17, 2002); and "Islamic Ruling," pp. 2-3.

¹⁶ Based upon the tables in Shaul Shay, *The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks* (trans. Rachel Lieberman, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2004), pp. 225-42.

¹⁷ For these women's accounts, see Barbara Victor, *Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers* (Rodale, 2003).

¹⁸ Noted by Scot Atran, "Genesis of Suicide Terrorism," *Science* (299:2003), pp. 1536-7; Clark McCaulkey, "Psychological Issues in Understanding Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism," in Christopher Stout (ed), *The Psychology of Terrorism* (Westwood: Praeger, 2002), pp. 1-29.

¹⁹ Avishai Margalit, "The Suicide Bombers," *New York Review of Books* (Jan. 16, 2003).

²⁰ See *Intifadat al-Aqsa* (Amman: Dar al-Jalil, 2001-3), a six volume martyrology of all those killed during the Second Intifada, including suicide attackers.

²¹ See bbc.com "Inside a Chechen Bomber's mind" (Sept. 4, 2003); "Russia's Suicide bomb Nightmare" (Feb. 6, 2004).

²² Interviews with Muhammad Farooq Khan (Peshawar); Mu`min Tahir (May 23-4, 2004).

²³ Interviews with the Na'ib of the Madrasat Masjid DehKaraslik (Kokand); Mukhtar `Ali (Margelan); Nurallah `Abd al-Fattah (Margilan); Harun b. Ayyub (Namangan), Abd al-Mukhtar Hajir Eminjon (Andijan) (June 5-6, 2004).

²⁴ See "Violent Unrest rocks Uzbekistan" bbc.com (March 30, 2004); and "Uzbekistan's Affluent Suicide Bombers," iwpr.net (April 20, 2004).

²⁵ See Rizal Sukma, "Indonesia and the Challenge of Radical Islam after Oct. 12," in Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan (eds), *After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2003), pp. 341-56.

²⁶ Sources not previously listed: *Masa'il jihadiyya* (Beirut, 2003); Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Khutab minbariyya* (Cairo: Dar Wahba, 1998).