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| Fig. 1: This is a photo of Hiroshima after the explosion of the Atomic Bomb. (Source: Wikimedia Commons) |
It is necessary to understand nuclear terrorism as well as the steps that must be taken to ensure that nuclear terrorism never happens.
Allison defines nuclear terrorism under the pretext of an individual or terrorist organization detonating a nuclear weapon. [1] Indeed, one such form one could imagine is a terrorist organization such as The Taliban detonating a nuclear bomb within a large American city. [1] The remains of Hiroshima after its atomic bombing (see Fig. 1) show how horrible this would be. Another such potential nuclear terrorist action could be individual actors placing small nuclear weapons within large cities across the world for ideological purposes. [1] According to Bunn, the reality of these scenarios is troublesome, but the question remains as to (1) does there exist a threat of nuclear terrorism (i.e. do terrorists have access to either the know-how to make nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons themselves) and (2) what further steps need to be taken to prevent a potential nuclear terrorist attack. [2]
Castillo claims that before any nuclear terrorist attack could happen a terrorist organization would need to gain nuclear weapons. [3] This could take the form of two major avenues. First, terrorists could gain access to nuclear material to create their own nuclear weapon. Second, terrorists or terrorist organizations could buy (via the black market) nuclear weapons. [3]
According to Bunn, terrorists who gain access to materials necessary for a nuclear bomb would know how to construct it. [2] He cites a discussion between Senator Joseph Biden and nuclear weapon specialists to make this point. When Senator Biden was serving as the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, he was told by the US nuclear weapons laboratories that most organized terrorist groups that gain access to nuclear materials could construct nuclear weapons. [2]
What about the dangers of terrorists buying or gaining access to nuclear weapons already in existence? Allison points out that access to the stockpiles of the Soviet Union, the largest in the world, became problematic after the collapse of the Soviet Union. [1] The chief issues were security and logistics. [2] According to Howard Baker (former Republican head of U.S. Senate and the former U.S. ambassador to Japan), "it really boggles my mind that there could be 40,000 nuclear weapons, or maybe 80,000 in the former Soviet Union, poorly controlled and poorly stored, and that the world is not in a near-state of hysteria about the danger [this poses]." [4] Allison speculates that some numbers of these weapons have already found their way into the black market.
Allison also points out that repeated attempts have already been made to steal nuclear weapons. [4] Even more troublesome, he points out that more than 1,000 proven nuclear weapons and more than 10,000 potential nuclear weapons (i.e. highly enriched uranium and or plutonium) sit in storage centers within Russia deemed unsafe and highly susceptible to theft, according to the US government. [4] These are different than the some 40,000 nuclear weapons is the soviet arsenal at the end of the Cold War. Allison points out that, after the fall of the USSR, there were hundreds of confirmed cases of successful theft of nuclear materials in which the thieves were only later captured. [4] The amounts of material are very large. The average units of energy released from a Russian nuclear weapon sits around hundreds of kilotons of TNT. [5]
While this is troublesome, it is far from the worst, according to Allison. It is recognized that one of the most difficult nuclear terrorist situations to contain or prevent would be one where the nuclear weapon in question was small and easily transferable, according to Allison and Bunn. [2] Yet, Allison confirms that in 1997 nearly 64% of the original KGB suitcase nuclear weapons were either lost or had an unknown location within modern day Russia. [4] We know such nuclear weapons exist outside the sphere of influence of any one nation-state says Allison. From here he argues it would not be implausible for some terrorist organization to purchase this weapon. [4]
It is apparent from the previous discussion and published works, notably from Allison, that one of the greatest threats from nuclear terrorism is from these terrorists gaining access to existing unaccounted for nuclear weapons. This alone furthers Allison's argument that any fool-proof anti-nuclear terrorism strategy needs to include the United States cooperating with other nations, such as Russia. According to Allison, the most effective means to do this requires securing all nuclear weapons unaccounted for by authorities. [1]
Allison also says that nuclear aspirant nations (such as Iran and North Korea) need to stop producing materials necessary for nuclear weapons, such as plutonium. [1] Only when the United States, Russia, and other large powers can dictate all aspects of nuclear weapons will this threat be sufficiently mitigated, he says. [1] In other words, the United States and Russia need to ensure that rogue states such as North Korea do not acquire nuclear weapons.
If a nation (such as Pakistan) with strong ties to terrorist organizations gains access to nuclear weapons, the United States (and other nations with nuclear weapons) need to ensure that said nation does not spiral into political instability, says J. J. Castillo. [3] If it does spiral into political instability, Castillo argues that the world would see the same situation that took place after the fall of the USSR. As stated previously, this instability in Eastern Europe was responsible for the unaccountability of thousands of nuclear weapons. [3]
© Riley Noland. The author warrants that the work is the author's own and that Stanford University provided no input other than typesetting and referencing guidelines. The author grants permission to copy, distribute and display this work in unaltered form, with attribution to the author, for noncommercial purposes only. All other rights, including commercial rights, are reserved to the author.
[1] G. Allison, "How to Stop Nuclear Terror," Foreign Aff. 83, 64 (2004).
[2] M. Bunn and A. Wier, "Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How Difficult?" Ann. Am. Acad. Polit. Social Sci. 607, 133 (2006).
[3] J. J. Castillo, "Nuclear Terrorism: Why Deterrence Still Matters," Curr. Hist. 102, 426 (2003).
[4] G. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (Times Books, 2004).
[5] A. B. Carter et al., "The Day After: Action Following a Nuclear Blast in a U.S. City," Washington Quarterly 4, 30, (2007).
